​​For better or worse, meritocracy shapes many of our ideals concerning achievement. On the one hand, as the famed Ibn Khaldūn summarized in his Muqaddimah: The work ethic of a people is strongest when the fruits of their labor are safe from the reach of government usurpation. Simply put, when people believe that hard work results in success, they work hard. This is meritocracy at its commendable best. On the other hand, an overemphasis on meritocracy may have the effect of minimizing the role of providence in success. Moreover, when success, and by extension prosperity, are separated from the Divine prerogative they are no longer embraced as tests and responsibilities. Quite the reverse, in the absence of an intentional acknowledgment of God’s favor, achievement—more than even appearance, talent, or status—can become a great source of delusion and ingratitude. If our individual worthiness, dedication, or ability has secured for us what we have, how do we view those who haven’t achieved as much? Are they definitively less worthy, unintelligent, or lazy? The Prophet (upon him be peace) said: “Whoever has an atom’s weight of arrogance in his/her heart will not enter Paradise.” Upon hearing this, one of the companions asked, “God’s Messenger! But a man may take pride in his appearance; this is an expression of arrogance?” The Prophet (upon him be peace) continued, “Indeed, God is beautiful and He loves beauty. Arrogance, however, is expressed in the wanton rejection of truth and looking at people with contempt.” The spiritual consequences of arrogance are indeed grave. Fortunately, God offers us a very expedient and effective way of reducing our susceptibility to it. Thanks and giving or ash-shukr and aṣ-ṣadaqa: Gratitude and charity are universally cited as foundational for a good life. For Americans and our often naïve beliefs around meritocracy; inundated with rags to riches stories and biographies which capture the heroic journeys of our cultural heroes, the need for these is even more immediate. The Islamic tradition is replete with conceptual frameworks which vivify the ideals of thanks and giving. In consonance with the spirit of the season and Giving Tuesday (which must be the most Islamic of all the days on the American social calendar after Mother’s Day!) we at the American Learning Institute for Muslims (ALIM) wanted to offer a few reflections.

​Ta’ḍhīm ash-Shari’ah or esteem for the law has always defined the Muslim community. Familiarity with the language of the law and its categories among non-specialists is a unique feature of our community. If truth be told, as a student of Shari’ah, I express a quiet joy each time I encounter Muslims who negotiate the realities of day-to-day life through the use of terms like: ḥarām, halāl, makrūh, obligatory, permissible, recommended, etc. Whether we have training in Islamic law or not; deploy the language of the law with precision and clarity or not; simply invoking the law expresses some of our deepest moral commitments. Namely, that the God we serve is concerned about us and has given us guidelines by which to lead good lives. Additionally, a concern with law articulates a faith that is relevant in the lives of believers. 

For some, Imam Muhammad Adeyinka Mendes’s beautifully rendered translation of The Spirits of Black Folk: Sages through the Ages will prompt them to ask: “Why is this necessary?” They would not be out of place to raise such a question. Many Muslims view the current conversation around race in our community with a jaundiced eye. In asking “why”, I do not believe they intend to invalidate the grievances of Black communities. Nor do I assume them to be enthralled to certain manifestations of anti-Blackness that instinctively respond with dismissal to any celebration of Black people. To be honest, I think they are justifiably anxious. It requires only a modicum of imagination and dialectical skill to realize the problematic implications of the way in which race and identity are discussed in our society. “How will such a specific focus on Blackness—itself socially constructed and incidental—alter our understanding of transcendent Truth?” they ask with great concern. And I appreciate this.

​“The Third Resurrection” refers to Blackamerican engagement with the scholarly
tradition of Islam. It is not simply about learning the tradition. To be sure, classical training is an
essential point of departure. However, the Third Res, cannot be realized until we deploy tradition
in ways that are both authentic and relevant. This requires a subtle balance. On the one hand,
tradition places a premium on precedent and on the other, many of the realities confronting
Blackamerican Muslims are unprecedented.

Most classical articulations of Islamic law are unanimous concerning the prohibition of Muslim women marrying non-Muslim men. Sūrat al-Mumtaḥana declares, {“…These women are not lawful wives for the disbelievers, nor are the disbelievers lawful husbands for them.”} [60:10].  This was revealed about Muslim émigrés to Medina that were married to Makkan polytheists. However, consistent with the Islamic legal maxim which states, “Interpretive consideration is given primarily to the general import of a text, not the particular event that occasioned the text.” (al-‘ibra bi ‘umūm al-lafdh wa laysa bi khuṣūṣ as-sabab), the verse became the basis of a general prohibition of interreligious marriage between Muslim women and non-Muslim men. Conversely, on the basis of the following verses in Sūrat al-Mā’ida: {“…Lawful unto you in marriage are (not only) the virtuous women of the believers but also virtuous women from among those who were given the Scripture (Jews and Christians) before your time…”}[5:5]

Muslim men were granted permission to intermarry with Jewish and Christian women. This allowance is not extended to Muslim women; neither in the scriptural sources nor the compendia of positive law. One would expect a ruling which expresses such a clear gender bias to generate a great deal of debate within the tradition.  Yet, it doesn’t appear that much ink was spilled by classical scholars concerning the issue. The lack of engagement here is likely an indication that the assumptions concerning gender and/or marriage, which underlie these rulings, are either considered essential or consistently demonstrable. Within our community, many women have begun to question this ruling. Although I wish I didn’t have to, it’s important to highlight the devoted and informed nature of the questions being posed.  Too often those deferential to tradition are unable to treat the questions, concerns, and critical insights of Muslim women with integrity. Yes, it is true that we live in a context in which revealed religion in general and Islam in particular is under heavy assault by philosophical liberalism. However, a Muslim woman asking questions through which she hopes to gain clarity about her faith is not engaged in a covert or unwitting attempt to destroy traditional Islam!  

As mentioned, scholars’ intellectual output on this issue is surprisingly limited. Nonetheless, the protection of faith is the most consistent reason offered for the prohibition. The idea being: a Muslim woman marrying a non-Muslim man would be placed in a precarious position with regard to the free exercise of her religion. Ironically, the nature of this precariousness is never really spelled out. It appears that pre-modern scholars understood “something” to be a given and their modern-day successors agreed. Was the source of that presumed precariousness legal? Islam recognizes not only the right of a Christian or Jewish woman married to a Muslim man to practice her faith, but also identifies each of those traditions as emanating from authentic Prophetic messages. In other words, a Jewish or Christian woman married to a Muslim man enjoys legal protection to exercise her faith AND a presumed modicum of respect for her prophets and religious tradition. Perhaps for classical scholars, the Muslim woman in a similar circumstance was presumed to enjoy neither. This reason would mean that the difference in the two rulings on intermarriage for men and women only secondarily involves gender. The primary difference involves understandings of tolerance within the respective religious traditions. 

Or is the assumed precariousness practical? The Qur’ān states {“Men are the caretakers of women. Men have been provisioned by God for the task and bear the responsibility of financially supporting women. And righteous women are compliant and when alone, protective of what God has entrusted them with…”} [4:34] This verse portrays the husband providing the foundational care and support upon which the couple’s life together is built. Our context—where there is much concern about hierarchy between men and women—will undoubtedly impact the way we read the compliance expected from wives in this verse. Unfortunately, some men and women in our community imagine this verse to refer to “the man” at the top handing out orders to his faithful ward. God help us. In fact, the opposite is true. This verse envisions the husband at the base, responsible for contributing foundational security and comfort. Upon that foundation, both husband and wife make other qualitatively more important spiritual and emotional contributions to their lives together. However, the nature of a base or foundation, of anything, as a matter of fact, is that it delimits and determines the character of what can be built on top of it. In other words, the verse cited above expresses a framework for marital harmony: The contributions of wives to their families are expected to be compliant or consistent with the material foundations provided by their husbands. This is the Qur’anic ideal regarding marriage. Upon that ideal, it’s easy to understand how a Muslim woman could be potentially compromised by having a non-Muslim husband. For example, what if her husband decides to own vineyards and sell wine for their livelihood? Would she be expected to comply? Can she, as a Muslim, build her life and make contributions to her family upon such a foundation?  This might be the precariousness classical scholars had in mind when upholding this prohibition. Within this reason for the preponderant ruling, i.e., that it is impermissible for Muslim women to marry non-Muslim men, gender is effective. However, it is not through the lens of essential masculine and feminine archetypes but rather socially contingent roles. 

I’m using the term “essential” masculinity and femininity to refer to the perspective of those who understand the verse, {…”and the male is not like the female…”} [3:36] to refer to more than the different roles into which we’ve been socialized. Rather, this view maintains, there are primordial or natural differences between men and women that make it inadvisable for Muslim women to marry non-Muslim men. It’s likely that some will take exception to this view. It has very bad company.  Historically, the most horrendous “self-serving, other-obliterating” ideologies, theories, beliefs, etc have been justified by citing “natural” differences. French sociologist Robert Hertz said it well, “Every social hierarchy claims to be founded on the nature of things. It thus accords to itself eternity; it escapes change and attacks the innovators.” However, to my mind, the most effective way to counteract toxic hierarchies is not by accepting the positive value of the characteristics of those at the top and then proving, “we’re that way too.”  This could result in self-obliteration.  Rather, it involves taking stock of oneself and affirming the positive value of your distinctiveness. In the context of offering a reason for the traditional ruling on intermarriage between Muslim women and non-Muslim men, Muslim women must take stock of themselves. Some of the ‘natural difference’ arguments might be regarded as inaccurate while others resonate. For example, an argument which states that a woman is so predisposed to following the example of her husband that just the act of marrying a non-Muslim man will remove her faith in God and His Messenger (upon him be peace) may be false. On the other hand, the idea that women derive greater satisfaction from group activity within families and are more adversely affected by its absence than men could be relevant.

​“A ruling necessarily follows the existence or absence of its reason” (al-ḥukmu yadūru ma ‘illatihi wujūdan wa ‘adman). In Islamic law, when looking at transactions (muāmalāt)—as opposed to acts of worship (‘ibādāt)—this maxim is cited often. In regard to the ruling that religious intermarriage is impermissible for Muslim women the reason given is protection of their integrity. The question is “protection from what?” In each of the scenarios we explored it’s easy to imagine how women might no longer find those reasons determinative. The right to freely exercise religious conviction is the first amendment of the US Constitution. American Muslim women enjoy legal protection to practice their faith and many progressive Jewish and Christian denominations have developed broad, ecumenical approaches to their respective traditions which reserve a place of honor for Islam. Additionally, there has never been a time in which men were the breadwinners in all families. In America today this is probably less common than ever. Families are structured in ways in which financial responsibility is shared. Many women no longer rely solely on their husbands to provide religiously acceptable livelihoods. And the arguments about essential masculinity and femininity impacting intermarriage are either something one accepts or not. On the whole, I submit that all of this is probabilistic. However, on account of the classical scholars unanimity on this position, the possibility that the reason for this ruling is a ḥikmah ilāhīya (Divine wisdom) to which we lack access and my own religious conservatism, I personally would find no solace in departing from precedent as a general rule. Nonetheless, I aspire to be sensitive to the plight of my Muslim sisters who desire to be married but who are with extremely limited options among Muslim men. First and foremost, I commit to holding brothers responsible for getting our stuff together so that we can be husbands. Secondly, for Muslim women seriously considering this as an option, I encourage them to seek counsel through personalized legal responsa (fatwa). Perhaps scholars trained in iftā (the issuance of fatwa) will be able offer opinions which move beyond general rules and come closer to home.

Ubaydullah Evans
Chicago 2020